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1Introduction
Modern-day France is wrought with social tensions surrounding the issue of
immigration and what it means for the country's national identity. As a country of strong
nationalism, with cultural unity at the center of that sense of nationalism, the French are
finding themselves at odds with a large population of immigrants that cannot help but
standout: the Muslims of North African descent, the region the French refer to as the
Maghreb. France is not the only country to experience a recent heavy influx of Maghrebi
immigrants, but it is the European nation who can currently claim the most. I Of course,
this is not a new occurrence. France has been both recruiting and receiving heavy flows
and stocks of immigrants since the nineteenth century, making it one of the oldest
European destinations for immigrants.i The main instances of heavy immigration to
France include the first wave during the Industrial Revolution, when the state recruited
Belgians, Poles, and Italians for work in French factories. In the 1930s and again in the
1960s, France recruited large numbers of North Africans from its colonies in the
Maghreb to supplement the labor force. The immigration stream continued until today.
The legacy of those same immigrants is very present in France. Some citizens of North
African descent are second or third generation and new immigrants come every day as
part of familial reunion or in search of asylum. In fact, a 2006 statistic from a French
bureau declared that over 8% of the French population is foreign-born, with less than half
of those immigrants coming from Europe and about 60% emigrating from Africa.3
With all of these new immigrants, the people of France are faced with changing
demographics, and an infusion of foreign culture. This has prompted the recent debate
centered on what exactly is the national French identity. While some have dismissed this
debate as a political gesture aimed at securing more votes come election time, others have
1Alex Derry. "Pray-but not outside." Maclean's 124, no. 38 (October 3,2011): 34.
2 Virginie Guiraudon. "Moroccan Immigration in France: Do Migration Policies Matter?" Journal Of
Immigrant & Refugee Studies 6, no. 3 (September 2008): 368.
3 Virginie Guiraudon. 368-369.
2become genuinely concerned with the subject. In the face of globalization, assuming
such a phenomenon exists, can a nation truly hold on to a static national identity? What
procedures should be put in place to preserve such an intangible concept? The French
government has put many new measures in place regarding both immigration and
assimilation in the hopes of countering some of the effects of the heavy Muslim presence
in the country. From lessening numbers of immigrants let in the country each year,
especially regarding those from Africa, to a signed affidavit promising adequate
assimilation into the nation and its culture, France is striving to control the influx of
immigrants, as well as the presumed assault on French culture.
In particular, several scholars argue that the trademarks of the Muslim religion
make it difficult for its followers to blend in to Western society, especially one such as
France, where the principle of laicite, or secularism, has been an important part of public
life since the French Revolution. However there are some examples of integration, for
instance immigrants who have assimilated, participate in civic life by becoming lawyers,
voting during elections, or participating in unions. They do not give up their religion, but
they merge their traditional beliefs with the ideas of the state. An example would be the
Berber, or Amazigh, activists."
But the perfect examples of assimilation are eclipsed by the instances of car-
bombings, riots, and even murders that have plagued France's banlieues, or low-rent
suburbs, committed by immigrants of Muslim origin. As the immigrant population,
especially the young, who are already more subject to indignant outbursts, find it
increasingly difficult to be accepted in French society, from finding employment to
peacefully interacting with police, they are more and more likely to act out against their
perceived oppressors. In response to the violence, the French government has tightened
its policing of the banlieues, which, according to some observers such as Paul A.
Silverstein, Virginie Guiraudon, and Elisa T. Beller, probably causes more harm than
good. But what is the right answer? While the French Muslim youth are searching for
their cultural identity, France is intensely fighting to protect hers. Is it true the two are so
incompatible?
4 Paul A. Silverstein, "The context of antisemitism and Islamophobia in France, rt Patterns of Prejudice 42,
no. 1 (February 2008), 24.
3In this paper I examine the process of Muslim immigrants' integration, probing
into the negative French perceptions of immigrants and how these perceptions may affect
the process of integration and assimilation. I begin with a brief overview of French
history as related to Muslim societies and how French culture and policies have evolved
to their current state, such as the new strict policy on identity card renewal and the
promise to integrate if accepted into the country. Next I deal strictly with immigration in
France, including the policies and procedures of the French government and the
perceptions of the French population. In addition I examine the perception of North
African immigrants in particular, especially North African Muslims, and their sense of
security. I close with a section on French identity, how it has evolved and how it has
room to continue its evolution. Citations from French sources are translated by myself.
A Brief History of France
To better understand the relationship between the French and immigrants, as well
as between Christians and Muslims, an overview of brief selected history is required. As
Marc Bloch said, regarding the symbiotic relationship of the past and present, "men
resemble their times more than they resemble their fathers."s From the Crusades of the
Middle Ages to the French colonizing mission and later two World Wars, French history
is wrought with struggles and clashes between civilizations. And as history shapes
cultures and nations, it is important to understand it.
Starting with the Crusades, the French, who were once almost entirely Christian,
and Muslim nations have endured a rocky past. While the Crusades were certainly not
the sole reason for the enmity between the two, they made a substantial contribution to it
and the effects on Christian-Muslim relations was "profoundly destructive", as one expert
puts it.6 Both sides viewed the other in stereotypical and negative ways that were full of
dislike and contempt. And although the Crusades did not begin as an attack on Muslims,
per se, it certainly concluded as such, for once they were named enemies of Gods,
heretics, polytheists, and other derogatory, slanderous names, finding common ground
5 Marc Bloch, Apologie pour t'nistoire, ou metier d'historien (Paris: 1949), 57-58, quoted in Carol Symes,
"The Middle Ages between Nationalism and Colonialism". French Historical Studies 34, no. 1 (2011), 39.
6 Norman Housley, "The Crusades and Islam," Medieval Encounters 13, no. 2 (July 2007), 190.
4between Christians and Muslims was useless." Eventually, in order to better understand
their enemies, the Christian knights were urged to learn about their Muslim foes, but even
then much misunderstanding occurred, likely due to the decades of mistrust and hate, as
well as the convenience provided by an evil foil. And it was completely feasible to fight,
and even negotiate with the Muslims without truly understanding their beliefs. A
stigmatization of the Muslims as enemies of God was ultimately more conducive to
fighting, as it is easier to battle a religious enemy that is inherently in the wrong than one
who worships a god almost identical to one's own. Therefore, the Muslim threat was
characterized as evil and idolatrous polytheists, creating an image of the "wicked other"
or imago inimici.8 The description of Muslims ranged from "the incorrigible and militant
enemy of the Christian religion" to "enemies of Christ's Cross and faith, destroyers of
churches and relics, torturers, killers and enslavers of Christians", as well as heretics and
hedonists who followed a deceptive, clever magician." By depicting the Muslim people
as essentially evil agents of Satan, the Christian crusaders dehumanized their Muslim
foes thus justifying the massacre of them, all in the name of the Christian faith.
The legacy of the Crusades did not end with the thirteenth century, though. The
confrontation with the Turks in the fifteenth century marked the continued ill perception
Christians held of Muslims. Although in this new instance, the Turk was not only an
enemy of the faith, as all Muslims are, but also a barbarian. Genetic coding was popular
in the Middle Ages, and this denomination came from the Turks' origins as steppe
dwellers. Such concern for genetics also formed the premise for the Spanish suspicion of
Moors and Jews in the sixteenth century, which ultimately led to their expulsion. 10 The
theme of crusading continued on even into the nineteenth century, however, with the
influence of Sir Walter Scott's tales and the prominence of Orientalism, a cultural
movement concerning an interest in the East. 11
Coinciding with these events and perhaps because of them, France and other
European powers began expanding their influence and power into the Muslim near east,
beginning with France's invasion of Algeria in 1830. Many saw the Crusades as a
7 Housley, 195.
8 Housley, 197-198.
9 Housley, 200-201.
10 Housley, 206.
11 Jonathan Phillips, "The Call of the Crusades," History Today 59, no. 11 (November 2009),10-17.
5precursor, which was further emphasized when Syria submitted to French control in
1920. One man, Jean Longnon, wrote in 1929 that "The name of Frank has remained a
symbol of nobility, courage and generosity ... and ifour country has been caJled on to
receive the protectorate of Syria, it is the result of that influence.v'? The parallels
between colonialism and the Crusades are evident in such a light. Clearly, some French
still saw themselves as reclaiming land that was lost to their ancestors centuries before.
The Muslims, for their part, seemed to agree, most definitely during the First World War
When General Allenby captured Jerusalem in 1917. While Al1enby and the Allied
governments denied it having anything to do with religion or the Crusades, the
connection was too strong to be denied. 13 After the legacy of the Crusades, leaders from
strongly Muslim nations often saw a link between European colonialism and the spread
of Christianity. In the 1950s, the president of Egypt, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, used
Saladin, one of the most famous Muslim leaders of the Crusades, as an inspiration in
response to European imperialism. He called upon his citizens to remember that "the
Whole region was united for reasons of mutual security to face an imperialism coming
from Europe and bearing the cross in order to disguise its ambitions behind the facade of
Christianity.,,14 Saddam Hussein was another fan of Saladin's and sought to invoke his
Image.
There was more to colonialism than simply the legacy of the Crusades, however.
The French colonization of North Africa was both a military expedition and an
understanding as part of France's duty as a civilizing mission. 15 Although this mission
was instated in the name of universal citizenship, it actually began to play out as what
Jean-Loup Amselle termed "a war between the races.T'" This was emphasized by the fact
that in the French colonial Maghreb, the colonial administration made a point to
distinguish nationals, or Europeans, from the natives. This was a legal division called the
code de I'indigenat that lasted until 1870 for Jews in the region and 1958 for Muslims. It
12 Phillips, 10-17.
13 Phillips, 10-17.
14 Phillips, 10-17.
15 Paul A. Silverstein, "The context of antisemitism and Islamophobia in France," Patterns of Prejudice 42,
no. 1 (February 2008), 6.
16 Jean-Loup Amselle, Affirmative Exclusion: Cultural p:uralism_a~,d the Rule of Custo.m in France (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press 2003), quoted in Paul A. Silverstein, The context of antisemitism and
Islamophobia in France," patterns of Prejudice 42, no. 1 (February 2008), 7.
6refused citizenship to the natives and subjected them to a separate court system and legal
codes that were put in place by the French administration. The natives were seen as
inferior, and it was France's duty to enlighten them by bringing them the principles of
universalism so popular in France. Their inferiority was highlighted by the colonial
discourse of the time that attributed several characteristics to the "Arab personality ... its
'bellicose', 'hostile' nature, attributable to religious 'fanaticism'; and .. .its 'inveterate
laziness', resulting from a reverent 'fatalism' .,,17 The Arab, and particularly Muslim,
fatalist characterization was attributed to their supposed "laziness, dishonesty, suspicion,
unpredictability," etc, all which weakened their intellect and made them unable to move
towards modernity. Essentially, they were inassimilable. Although in contrast to this
view, most French scholars of the period treated the minority populations of Jews and
Berbers as more similarly to the French citizens, mostly due to their assumed lack of
religious fervor.18 On the part of the North Africans, a complex relationship was built
with the French based on "domination, subordination, but also cooperation.Y"
Although the colonial administration did not view its North African subjects as
equals or citizens, that did not stop the French from calling on the natives in times of war.
As Mahamet Timera wrote, of the four different waves of immigrants from the Maghreb,
the first substantial one came due to the First World War when France mobilized her
colonies, using the North Africans and Black Africans for the infantry, a process which
continued during the Second World War and the colonial wars that followed. And
although most returned home after the war, some chose to remain in France, marking
some of the original North African immigrants in France_2o For the Maghrebis, though,
the experience in the wars was an equalizing one, making them feel truly French. As one
17 Andre Servier L'lslam et 10psychologie du musulman (Paris: Challamel 1923),345-346, quoted in Paul
A. Silverstein, "The context of antisemitism and Islamophobia in France, " Patterns of Prejudice 42, no. 1
(February 2008), 7.
18 Paul A. Silverstein, 8.
19 "des relations complexes de domination, de subordination, mais aussi de « cooperation »." Mahamet
Timera, "L'immigration Africaine En France: Regards Des Autres Et Repli Sur Soi", L'immigration Africaine
En France. 44.
20 "La flliere militaire qui s'est mise en place des la premiere guerre mondiale (1914-1918) avec la
mobilisation des colonies par la France (bataillons de tirailleu;s :enegalais et d' Africains noirs participant
aux combats en suivi). Si la plupart des survivants son~ ren~res a I~ fl.n de la guerre, certains sont restes et
se sont installes en France", Mahamet rtmera. "L'immlgratlon Afncame En France: Regards Des Autres Et
Repli Sur Soi", L'immigration Ajricaine En France. 43
7man explains, "There was only a kilo of bread for ten men, I felt hunger, like the others.
And I was a prisoner for three years in Germany, with the rest of my regiment. At that
time, I was like the French, aII the same, like friends.v"
France and Immigration
The end of both World War I and World War II, after many North Africans
fought for the French, marked the first large wave of immigration. France souzht
b
workers to rebuild the country after the destruction of warfare and restart the economy, so
a labor force was recruited made up of Belgians, Poles, and Italians.22 To replace the
European labor force, recruiters later selected an abundant, uneducated and underpaid
African workforce that was easy to employ and able to return home when finished.23
Although, according to Francois Ceyrac, an administrator for Peugeot and former
president of eN.p.F., the recruited workers were not considered Muslims, but citizens of
France.?" That did not necessarily make them equals, however, as the jobs offered were
in factories and mines and other blue collar fields. The men were recruited on short-term
basis, paid very little, and were not permitted to form unions. If they became iII or were
injured, they were not paid, and were often sent home. Essentially, they were treated as
second-class citizens only in France to work. They were even shut off from the rest of
society, in the beginnings of the all-African banlieues or slums that still exist today. 25
This was a shock for the African immigrants, who thought themselves close to the French
nation and French people.i" There was a closer relationship, but between the
governments to provide labor to France and eliminate unemployment in the African
21 "II n'y avait qu'un kilo de pain pour dix hommes. J'ai creve de faim, comme les autres. Et je suis reste
trois ans prisonnier en Allemagne, avec tous ceux de mon regiment. A cette epoqus, on etait comme les
francais, to us pareils, comme des amis." Yamina Benguigui, Memoires d'immigres : L'heritage Maghrebin.
Paris: Canal + editions, 1997. 61.
22 Virginie Guiraudon, 368.
23 "Puis j'ai rendu visite aux peres, venus seuls dans les annees 50, a la demande expresse d' entreprises
francaises recrutant une main-d'ceuvre abondante, pas tres qualifiee, sous-payee, facile a employer et a
renvoyer chez elle, pour rem placer I'italienne et la portugaise." Yamina Benguigui, 10.
24 "Ce n'etaient pas des musulmans, c'etaient des citoyens francais." Yamina Benguigui, Memoires
d'immigres: t.'beritaqe Moqhrebin. Paris: Canal + editions, 1997. 15.
25 Y .
arruna Benguigui, 15-67.
26 "Du fait d'une decolonisation relativement paisible et de pres de trois decennlss de « cooperation»
avec la France, Ie traitement actuel des immigres d'Afrique noire en surprend plus d'un, convaincus qu'ils
avaient avec la France une relation privilegiee, en tout cas plus proche que les immigres d'autres regions
du globe." Mahamet Timera, 44.
8nations, not between the two cultures.i" Joel Dahoui, a recruiter for the Moroccan Office
ofImmigration (l'O.M.l.) from 1962 to 1980, explains "I was the recruiter for the
workforce, a brute workforce ... At the time, there was an accord between the Moroccan
office of employment and the Moroccan Office of Immigration for selecting from certain
areas. One would take three hundred workers from Marrakech, two hundred and fifty
from Fez, etc. In other words, we had a cake of immigration. In general, we preferred to
select from rural areas, for reasons of their mentality.v'"
During the Algerian War ofIndependence, between 1955 and 1962, the French
enterprises did not stop recruiting as workers were still needed. During that time,
however, in light of the war, the workers suffered from a hostile, suspicious environment
that has not yet ceased today.i" Others left Algeria in order to escape the fighting and
warfare and make use of their French citizenship (granted to Algerians of Muslim and
black African descent in 1958).30 Altogether, by war's end, there were over 400,000
North Africans living in France, most in large cities such as Paris, Lyon, and Marseille.]1
In 1974, the French government passed a ruling allowing the reunion of families
in France. In other words, women and young children could join the men who had left
them to work in French mines and factories. This new flow of immigration quickly
increased the number of North African immigrants in France, and, now that the wives had
been reunited with their husbands, French-African children began to be added to the mix.
As Mahamet Timera says, "the arrival of the wives began a process of feminization as
well as the rejuvenation of African immigration which gave birth to a second generation
27 Yamina Benguigui, 20.
28 "J'etais selectionneur de main-d'ceuvre, ce qu'on appelait des manoeuvres, donc une main-d'ceuvre
brute ...A partir de la, il y avait un accord entre Ie ministere du Travail marocain et I'Office d'immigration
au Maroc pour selectionner dans certains zones des contingents. On prenait trois cents travailleurs dans
la province de Marrakech, deux cent cinquante dans la province de Fes, etc. Autrement dit, on a partage
Ie gateau de I'immigration. D'une fac;on genera Ie, nous avons prefere selectionner en zone rurale, pour
des raisons de rnentalite." Yamina Benguigui, 16-17.
29 "La guerre d'Algerie, entre 1955 et 1962, nempeche pas les entreprises franc;aises de continuer a
recruter la rnain-d' ceuvre algerienne. Les attentats gagnent la metropols et engendrent, a I'egard des
Maghrebins, un climat d'hostllite et de mefiance qui, depuis, ne s'est jamais dementi." Yamina Benguigui,
19.
30 Yamina Benguigui, 15-67.
31 Paul A. Silverstein, 10.
9of black Africans, French citizens by right (according to the right of land). ,,32 In response
to the sudden increase in immigrants, as well as a time of economic crisis, the French
government issued a law that would provide ten thousand francs in aid to families who
wanted to return to their original country. They could not be forced to leave, although
they were certainly pressured to do SO.33 Even so, by the 1980s, there were
approximately 1.5 million North African immigrants residing in France, a phenomenon
that the French people observed through a "lens of violence" and referred to as an
invasion."
Although the waves of immigration may not be as forceful as they were in the
1930s, 1960s, and 1970s, the number of immigrants in France is still constantly
increasing today. Family reunification is still a strong cause of immigration, as well as
those seeking asylum from war and tyranny. For example, in 2003 out of the 22,339
residence permits granted to Moroccans in France, 7775 were due to family
reunification.35 Moroccans are one of the most prominent groups of foreigners in France ,
as well as Algerians, Turks, Portuguese, Chinese, Italians, and Americans. As for
immigrants seeking asylum, most come from Turkey, the Congo, Mauritania, Algeria,
and China.36
What is the French Identity?
Faced with the perceived threat of immigration, French nationalism has increased,
and intense debate has centered around the issue of French identity-what it is and how
to protect it. Such nationalism has inspired the requirement that French schools are now
ordered to fly the French flag, have a copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen in every classroom, and provide a "young citizen's manual" to students.37
32 "L'arrivee des femmes entraine un processus de feminisation, mais aussi de rajeunissement et de
« familialisation )} de I'immigration africaine qui donnera naissance a une seconde generation d' Africains
noirs, citoyens francais de droit (par Ie droit du sol)." Mahamet Timera, 43.
33 .
Yamma 8enguigui, 74-75.
34
Paul A. Silverstein, 10.
35 Virginie Guiraudon, 369-370.
36 V. .
Irgmie Guiraudon, 370.
37 Steven Erlanger "French 'Identity' Debate Leaves Public Forumn," New York Times, 9 Feb. 2010,
http://www.nyti~es.com/201O/02/09/world/europe/09france.html(accessed 2 Sep. 2011).
10
This practice coincides with the belief, increasingly prominent since the 1980s, that over
the centuries since the Revolution, France has maintained a relatively stable idea of its
national identity, and until the recent waves of immigration it maintained a cultural
homogeneity." This fierce sense of nationalism and the desire to protect the "national
identity" has been directed at Muslims recently as well. As of September 16, 2011, the
French government passed a law outlawing the increasingly common habit of praying in
the street, a practice Front National leader Marine le Pen has equated to the Nazi
invasions of World War II.39
However, many scholars argue that French has never been a culturally
homogenous country. From the melding of Franks, Celts, and Romans hundreds of years
ago, to the steady immigration from other European countries such as Portugal, Italy, and
Poland, the population has always been a melting pot.
40
In addition, French universities
and hospitals have long had a teaching history, attracting immigrant scholars for
centuries.
41
Regardless of the country's melting pot status, at least one cultural aspect has
been of importance since the Revolution, that of lai'cite, a core principle in France's
meritocratic system as well as necessary for the practice of the Rights of Man, which
decree no person or establishment may force their beliefs on another, nor make anyone
feel uncomfortable in their be1iefs.42 Of course, what is interesting in that approximation
is that France is essentially forcing her beliefs on all immigrants. The French
government, however, takes the stance that citizenship is based on a trade-off. The
citizen is granted citizenship on an entirely voluntary basis, but in so doing they must
promise to adhere to the values of the state.
43
Although critics have had their say as to whether or not France can even claim to
have a viable "national identity", a forum was launched online by France's minister of
national identity, Eric Besson, in November 2009 to access what the French believe about
their national identity. While supposedly most of the comments were tame, there was an
undeniable segment that was racist and xenophobic. Some examples include: "France
38 EI'rsa T. Beller, 586-587.
39 Alex Derry "Pray-but not outside," Maclean's 124, no. 38, (3 Oct. 2011): 34.
40 'Elisa T. Beller, 587.
41 Mahamet Timera, 44.
42 EI'rsa T. Beller, 589.
43 L'rav Orgad, 719-737.
11
has irrevocably become an African colony," "In adding violence and the renunciation of
their immigrant parents to the education of their children .... No French person asked to be
overrun by foreigners," "How can one say they are French and declare they want to be
entombed in their original country?,,44 On the subject of French identity in particular,
some responses were: "To be French, it's to be born in France, by two French parents,"
"It's the blood right, to be French, it is necessary to have French blood," "France and our
national identity, it's a cathedral in the center of Paris, not a mosque.?" Clearly there are
strong anti-immigrant sentiments within the country, although the exact numbers or
percentages are difficult to estimate. It is evident, however, that although much of the
population may not feel unduly threatened, there is a strong vocal minority who do.
The feeling of being tlueatened by a perceived "other" is not new. Philosophers
have long probed the idea of identity, and how one's identity can come into conflict with
another's. This can be seen in Camus' 17~eGuest, when his protagonist is faced with
transporting a criminal to the police. Although relatively untouched by the rumors of a
popular revolt, his introduction to the criminal alters his life and challenges his world
view. He does not condone what the man has done and wants no part in his crime, but he
also does not support his being put to death.46 Jacques Den·ida describes a similar theme
in his use of the term roue. A roue, or generally translated, a rogue, is someone society
has placed outside the realm of the norm, making them the other, and classifying them as
dangerous to society. As Derrida describes, "In the idea of the roue there is thus an
allusion to debauchery and perversity, to the subversive disrespect for principles, norms,
and good manners, for the rules and laws that govern the circle of decent, self-respecting
people, of respectable, right-thinking society. Roue characterizes a leading astray that
calls for exclusion or punishment.,,47 Because the rogue characters introduce an
44 "La France est devenue une colonie de I'Afrique de facon irremediable," "En ajoutant la violence et la
renonciation des parents immigres dans I'education de leurs enfants ...Aucun Fran<;:aisn'a demande a etre
envahi d'etrangers," "Comment peut-on se dire Fran<;:aiset declarer vouloir se faire enterrer dans son
pays d'origine," Soren Seelow, "sur Ie site d'Eric Besson: Ie pire du debat sur l'identite nationale," Le
Monde, 4 Dec. 2009, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/articie/2009/12/04/sur-le-site-d-eric-besson-1e-pire-
dU_debat_sur_l_identite-nationale_1275894_3224.html (accessed 2 Sep. 2011).
45 "Etre Fran<;:ais,c'est etre ne en France, des deux parents fran<;:ais," "C'est Ie droit du sang, pour etre
francais, il faut avoir du sang fran<;:ais.," "La France et notre identite nationale, c'est une cathedra Ie au
centre de Paris et non pas une mosquee." Soren Seelo
w
, 2009.
46 Albert Camus, "The Guest", Exile and the Kingdom, (London: Vintage, 2007).
47 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 2005), 20.
atmosphere of disorder, they are "picked out, denounced, judged, and condemned ... as
those accused and pursued" by both the police and the common man.
48
They represent
everything that is bad or needs repaired in the state. They take the form of the
unemployed who roam the streets.49 What is interesting is that the roue are considered to
be people outside the common convention, who act outside of the law or traditional
custom. But one could argue that the French Republic started that way, with the
overthrow of the monarchy.
Secular France
Perhaps the recent focus on immigration in France has less to do with
conservatism, as it does in most countries facing the same issue, and more to do with the
French Republic's focus and foundation of secularism, the concept of laicite. After the
conclusion of the French Revolution, during the birth of the First Republic, France's
founding fathers laid down several laws and ideals of French citizenship, including the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Itwas the Third Republic, however, that spawned the
idea of laicite and the separation of church and state.
50
The idea was to eliminate the
heavy influence of the Catholic Church in matters of state. The Church has historically
been very active in politiCS, and not only in France, whether by counseling rulers or
planting ideas and emotions in the minds of its followers. The concept of secularism was
instated not to outlaw religion, but to free the people of undue influence from anyone
sector so that they may be able to make their own decisions. This did not create a type of
militant atheism by any means, but mandated that religion "remain a wholly private
matter, that it not intrude into public debate or public view in any way.?"
The separation of church and state had much to do with the Dreyfus Affair shortly
before the turn of the century, in which a Jewish army captain was falsely accused and
convicted of spying for Germany. The military tribunal, as well as others involved in the
case, were later revealed to have falsified evidence as well as committing many other
injustices. During the controversy, however, the church sided with and supported its
48 Jacques Derrida, 63-64.
49 Jacques Derrida, 65. '50 Elisa T. Beller, "The Headscarf Affair: The conseil d'Etat on the Role of Religion and Culture in French
SOCiety," Texas International Law Journal 39, no. 4 (Summer 2004), 589.
51 EI'rsa T. Beller, 589.
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longtime ally, the military. It publicly maintained that the case should not be reviewed
,
which appeared suspicious after the truth was brought to light. "Extricating the church
from all involvement in governance (there were even some restrictions on individual
Catholics' opportunity to become civil servants) was a way of asserting that the old
sources of authority, including the church and the military, had no place in the Republic
of meritocracy and individual freedom of belief.,,52This concept has remained a
celebrated aspect of French government and society ever since, and is placed in the same
esteem as the ideas of fraternity, equality, and liberty.
Therefore, the recent issues being faced by the state such as the wearing of the hijab or
praying in public, which will be discussed later, likely has less to do with racism or the
dislike of Islam, and more to do with maintaining the secularism of France. Shows of
religion in public, regardless of the creed, infringe on the country's secular idea, as well
as on the individual freedom of belief for each citizen. The state is not requiring Muslims
to abandon their traditional religion or beliefs, but to follow them in the privacy of their
own home or place of worship, out of the eyes of those who would feel offended by it.
The same is true for Catholics, Christians, Buddhist, etc. Those of the Muslim faith feel
singled out, but Islam is only the most recent religion to be in the crosshairs.
The Concept of Integration/Assimilation
Even before the various waves of immigration the French nation received, there
existed distinct rules and expectations for immigrants who desired to be citizens,
although those regulations have changed somewhat overtime. Beginning with the French
Revolution, and the start of the First Republic, the new French government created a
system of guidelines that applied to every citizen, including and especially immigrants.
From the French Revolution through each regime change, the French ideal of citizenship
has evolved, but not as much as one might think. In fact, the most drastic changes have
occurred over the last few decades, largely in response to immigration.
Elisa T. Beller describes the period between the Revolution and the late twentieth
century as a time where France actually retained a fairly stable idea of "itself as a nation
whose residents in order to be worthy of the title 'citizen,' must actively take on its
,
52 EI'rsa T. Beller, 593.
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culture, including the all-important French language, and participate in its political life."
She continues by explaining that although the idea of citizen may have evolved over
time, it retained the importance of participating in both French culture and politicallife.
53
However, this definition of citizenship allows, in theory, anyone with an affinity for
French culture to become a citizen. Because the tide of North African immigrants stood
apart from French culture (namely white Christianity), this conflicted with the French
reckoning of citizenship. Some scholars, however, such as Virginie Guiraudon, reject
this opinion, stating that the French culture has undergone substantial evolution over the
past few centuries, and that France is in fact a melting pot with a blend of cultures
resulting from a long history of immigration from other European countries. 54
During the French Revolution and the period following it, less focus centered on
the amount a citizen participated in culture and instead emphasized the importance of the
rights of all men, especially French citizens. While all of the articles listed in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen are relevant and necessary, some of
the most important in the light of immigration and the question of what makes a citizen
are articles two, four, five, and ten. Article two states "The aim of all political
association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These
rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." Article four promises
that "Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence
the exercise of natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the
other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be
determined by law." In continuation ofthe former article, article five states, "Law can
only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented which is
not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law."
Finally, of particular importance in the issue of cultural practice and assimilation, is
article ten, "No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious
views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by
law.,,55 These articles state that every man, not just a white Christian Frenchman, is
53 I·Elsa T. Beller, 586.
54 EI·rsa T. Beller, 587.
55 "Declaration of the Rights of Man", The Avalon project, Yale Law School,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (accessed 7 Jul. 2012).
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guaranteed the rights of "liberty, property, security, and the resistance to oppression",
maintaining that liberty entails anything that does not hurt others or break the law, which
can only outlaw behaviors harmful to society. And of course, there is the freedom of
one's views and beliefs, one's opinions, so long as they do not disturb the law. Nowhere
in those rights does it state that culture must be adhered to above all else. In the words of
Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, "What is a nation? A body of associates living under C01111non
laws and represented by the same legislative assembly.T? It is legal authority on which
citizenship depended; ethnic similarity was of no import. While the Revolutionary state
was opposed to "foreigners", this term did not necessarily take the word in the literal
sense, it could also be applied to opponents of the new regime. Jean-Lambert Tallien, a
famous revolutionary leader, claimed, "[t]he only foreigners in France are bad citizens,"
so clearly the new government was not intrinsically opposed to the foreign-born.57
Instead, good citizenship has traditionally been emphasized, regardless of one's origin.
Very little changed in the idea of citizenship until the Third Republic, where
several new doctrines became a part of the republican ideal. Two important ones
included the introduction of mandatory primary education, which was launched in 1882,
and the separation of church and state in 1905. The separation of church and state,
coined laicite, marked a move away from the influence of the Catholic Church in favor of
a government ruled more truly by the people. However, even after the Church was cast
out of political affairs, it remained an important aspect of French culture. Laicite
maintains that religion stays in the private sphere of one's life and does not encroach on
public matters or the public view. And as Beller explains, "Education became the single
most important point of contact between state and citizen: it was the prime way that
French culture and active citizenship were to be conveyed.T'' Unlike the American
education system, which is governed on the local level, the French system maintains a
structure that is run by the state. Because schools are state-run, and secularism is of such
high importance, that is especially emphasized in the classroom, where teaching
professionals are in the process of creating young citizens. 59
56 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieves, What is the Third Estate? (1789), 58, quoted in Elisa T. Beller, S90.
57 Jean-Lambert Tallien, quoted in Elisa T. Beller, 592.
58 Elisa T. Beller, 589.
59 Elisa T. Beller, 590.
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The focus on cultural unity and the assimilation necessary for citizenship became
more important in the latter half of the twentieth century. Even though Article 22 in the
Uni versal Declaration of Human Rights, drafted in the aftermath of World War II, states
that "Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
the realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and culture
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality. ,,60 After
the Algerian War of Independence, however, the French tended to see immigrants in a
different light, and wanted to make sure they were loyal to France and not their home
country. The best way to accomplish that was cultural assimilation. There was an
outbreak of both popular and police violence against immigrants suspected of
participating in the Algerian nationalist movement, although all persons of North African
descent were indiscriminately targeted in these attacks." Suspicion of Algerians and
French people of Algerian descent continued during the economic crisis of the 1970s, as
some French citizens placed the blame for the recession on the immigrants, a habit that is
as old as history itself. Itwas because of this that the law was passed in 1976 to aid
immigrants in returning home. If France could not assimilate its mass quantity of
immigrants, they would be shipped home "voluntarily".62
At the close of the French-Algerian War, however, in response to the many
children born in France or who had spent the majority of their life in the country, it was
decided that any children born after 1962 (the end of the war) would have dual
citizenship. Although this was intended as a measure to decrease the distinctly African
culture being pressed upon the youth, that was not the case. Many French people still
attributed a North African nationality to the children. As one man said, "And my
children, who were born in France, who do not speak Arabic, who speak French, who
think French, why do people impose upon them the nationality of the country of origin of
60 Thomas M. Adams, "Universalism in One Country: LaProtection Sociale over the Longue Duree," French
Historical Studies 34, no. 3 (Summer 2011), 434.
61 Paul A. Silverstein, 11.
62 Yamina Benguigui, 21-22.
17
their father? It complicates life and gives an easy argument to racists.,,63 In response to
their children's ability to essentially choose their nationality, many parents wanted to
give them enough information about the Maghreb for them to make the right choice,
pressing even more North African culture upon them. One father remarked, "Double
nationality. That means they can have a choice. That's why I took all my children to
Algeria, one month, two months, until they were seventeen, eighteen years old. Because
I did not want to the shocked, I wanted them to understand life there, the mentality of
Algerian people.,,64
Women often had a different view, however, because after the wives of immigrant
workers were brought to France for family reunification, they were held in transient
cities, supposedly for only a few months. During such time, they were expected to learn
the French language and be acclimated to French culture, and after they were settled they
could relocate. Unfortunately, many women spent up to twenty years in a slum-like
environment, where instead of becoming more French, they were isolated from French
culture and therefore recreated their own.65 But the government presumed assimilation to
be the solution, creating new policies and procedures for the immigrant men, women, and
children.The 1980s marked the first drastic evolution in the ideal of citizenship, starting
when another economic crisis hit and popular opinion once again blamed the immigrants,
resulting in the parents and children sometimes being cast out of the country for alleged
misbehavior, often on the grounds that they had two passports anyway. Yamina
Benguigui states, "the economic crisis amplified unemployment, delinquency, and drug
use ... popular opinion began to see immigrants as responsible, without realizing that the
youth, born in France, were neither foreigners nor immigrants, and that they were little by
little becoming a new facet ofFrench society. That didn't stop the politicians from
63 "Et mes enfants, qui sont nes en France, qui ne parlent pas arabe, qui parlent fran<;:ais, qui pensent
fra ncais, pou rquoi leu r Impose-t -on d' avolr la na[;Onalite d u pays d' origi ne de leur per e ? Ca cornpllque I,
vie et ca donne des arguments faciles aux racistes." Yamina Benguigui, 33.
64 "La double nationalite. C'est-a-dire qu'ils peuvent avoir Ie choix. Et c'est pour ca que tout petits je les
ai ernmenes en Algerie, un mois, deux mois. jUSqu'a ce qu'ils aient 17, 18 ans. Parce que je ne voulais pas
qu'ils scient dephases, je voulals qu'lis solent au courant de la vie, de la mentalite des gens en Algerie."
Yamina Bengugui, 47.
65 Yamina Benguigui, 71-76.
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issuing a systematic expulsion.,,66 And despite the perception that these young people
were not French, when faced in a strange land so far from France, the country they felt
they belonged to, many died by either committing suicide or by trying to get on a boat to
go back to France.67 Heated instances of violence began occurring in the banlieues ,
either between the Muslim youth and police, or as acts against society. Tired of beinzD
singled out and subject to strong prejudices, a group of children of North African
heritage, often called Beurs, organized a peaceful march from Lyon to Paris in order to
draw attention to their struggle. This walk in 1983 became known as the Marche des
Beurs.68 And interestingly enough, despite the history of controversy between the two
religions, the Beur activism was heavily supported by Catholic social service
organizations.69 Immigrant and Muslim advocacy was not limited to the Marche,
however. A wealth of different groups began to spring up, forcing the government to
take notice of a new trend of ethnic politics.
7o
For many scholars, the violence and animosity against immigrants, as well as the
strong call for assimilation, was initiated by latent tensions over the loss of France's
North African colonies. "Some French citizens, particularly on the far right, regarded the
loss of Algeria and Morocco as a betrayal of France's mission to bring its culture to the
rest of the world.,,7l This view led to the belief that the presence of perceived "inferior"
North Africans in France was their attempt to colonize their former "civilized"
colonizers. Therefore the general dislike of cultural difference in general, as well as the
insult of the loss of French colonies, led to an animosity aimed at anything about the
immigrants that was not "French", which was almost everything.
72
The demand for assimilation continued to grow, however, and by 1989, France's
Conseil d'Etat ruled that wearing religious symbols to school was allowed as long as they
66 "la crise economique s'amplifie avec son cortege de chomage, de delinquance, de drogue ...Une partie
de I'opinion commence a rendre les immigres responsables, sans reanser que ces jeunes, nes en France,
ne sont ni des etrangerS ni des immigres, et qu'ils constituent peu a peu une nouvelle composante de la
societe francaise Cet etat de fait n'empeche pas les responsables politiques de pratiquer I'expulsion
systematique," Yamina Benguigui, 134.
67 Yamina Benguigui, 135.
68 Yamina Benguigui, 203-209.
69 Paul A. Silverstein, 13.
70 EI'rsa T. Beller, 598.
71 EI'rsa T. Beller, 590.
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are not "ostentatious". This, of course, was directed at the case of three young Muslim
girls who wore headscarves to school. Their principal tried to expel them, and the case
was brought to the Conseil. The Conseil is the country's highest administrative
jurisdiction, in charge of the management of administrative tribunals and courts of
appeals, and it both advises the government on bills and ordinances as well as judging
cases related to public administration and authority.I:' While it initially sounds as if the
ruling was in favor of the girls, its declaration that ostentatious meant anything that could
"constitute an act of intimidation, provocation, proselytizing, or propaganda; threaten the
dignity and freedom of students or other members of the educational community" was
incredibly ambiguous in nature and was essentially left up to educators to decide.74 Also,
the Conseil specifically stated that the purpose of a state education is to allow the child to
"acquire a culture" that prepares them to be a good person and ideal citizen.i" So by that
logic, a traditional culture that is not French runs up against the state's central mission to
bestow culture and make students ready to be active citizens. Between 1989 and 2003,
several similar controversies erupted in what has become known as the ({ffaire des voiles.
Miriam Feldblum, a scholar familiar with these events, states that the «flaire raised four
issues dealing with the concept of French identity and the need for assimilation: "the role
of secularism in the public school system; women's rights; 'the spectre of a
fundamentalist, aggressive Islam proselytizing France'; and the integration of North
Africans and other non-European immigrants"." The French saw the wearing of the
veils to be evidence of the immigrants' and second and third generation to retain their
own culture and religion, which conflicted with the French idea of national identity and
especially of laicite, which mandates religion be relegated to the private sphere. Muslim
North Africans for the most part, however, did not deny their Frenchness, in fact they did
not want to maintain a separation between themselves and French culture at all, they only
wanted to be treated as a community within France. They asserted their droit a la
difference, right of difference, emphasized by the Mitterrand government which legalized
immigrant associations banned since 1939, based on the French ideals of individual
73 Conseil d'Etat, "Home." Accessed August 6,2012. http://www.conseil-etaUr/en/.
74 Elisa T. Beller, 584.
75 Elisa T. Beller, 610.
76 Elisa T. Beller, 585.
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Iiberty.77 U fn ortunately for them, however, the French system of government deals with
individual rights, not group rights, since the latter are considered incompatible with the
French constitution. Instead, each citizen must stand alone with their one vote, as an
individual whose allegiance to the State supersedes any group or segment of the
population with whom they share interests.
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Proponents of the droit ala d(fference, however, attempt to demonstrate, both to
fellow Muslims and to other that Islam and France are not contradictory at all, in fact
they are so complementary they are almost "mutually reinforcing". This synthesis, or
blend of the two cultures, is most prominent in second generation immigrants who try to
integrate their parents' culture with that of their surroundings.
79
Others disagree with
their approach. For example, Gaston Defferre, a former socialist interior minister said in
an interview in 1984:
"When Poles, Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese live in France and decide to
naturalize, it matters little whether they are Catholics, Protestants, Jews, or
atheists ... But the rules of Islam are not simply religious rules. They are rules of
living that concern ... marriage, divorce, the care of children, the behavior of men,
the behavior ofwomen ... These rules are contrary to all the rules of French law on
the custody of children in case of divorce, and they are contrary to [French rules
on] the rights of women with respect to their husbands. What is more, in France
we don't have the same habits of living."so
This quote simply alludes to the nationalist feeling, in existence since the Crusades, that
Islam and the West will always be in conflict.
Some argue that the principle of laicite. however, does not mean that it forbids the
expression of one's religion, even if it is different than the established norm, but rather
that it tolerates all religions. In that light, because of its very secularism, France as a
State is tolerant to all faiths.81 However, because of the long-term stigma of Islam, the
77 Elisa T. Beller 59478 ,.
79 Elisa T. Beller, 599.
80 Elisa T. Beller, 594. . .
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insult of the end of colonialism, and the feeling of being infringed upon by the "other", as
well as an historical call for cultural unity, latcite is sometimes overruled by solidarite.
82
In the midst of the assimilation debate, another issue dealing with citizenship, one
that dates back to the Revolution, crept into conversation. There was much political
pressure to require French citizenship to be a personal choice. Jacque Chirac's political
party, the Rassemblement pour la RepubZique (RPR), referred to attaining French
citizenship as "a solemn pact based on mutual recognition and the will to live together.,,83
In other words, to be allowed to attain French citizenship, a person must be able to prove
significant participation in French civic life, which includes speaking the language,
enrollment in military service, lack of a criminal history, etc. This again brings the
discussion back to culture, as always, because although the concept of French nationhood
is political, it is expressed through cultural unity. Thus, "Political inclusion has entailed
cultural assimilation, for regional cultural minorities and immigrants alike", despite the
fact that, as Henri Lefebvre stated, "man is a complex being with multiple connections,
which are his memberships".84
The many memberships, or at least one, became a concern, especially after the
incidents of 9111. The native French population worried that the Muslims' decision to
wear the headscarf signaled their unwillingnesS to integrate, which piggybacked on the
fear that a fundamentalist Islam is trying to infiltrate the French state, even though most
Muslims do not recognize radical Islam as part of their religion.
85
That radical groups do
exist in Europe in general and France in particular, however, cannot be denied. It
appeared anxieties were confirmed after the arrest of French-Moroccan Zacarias
Moussaoui as the -zo" September 11th hijacker", as well as the discovery that the Taliban
counted several French citizens of North African heritage among its forces in
Af . . 86 Tl di .
Ighanistan and its "foreign fighters" in the Iraqi U1surgency. lese iscovenes only
added to the fears that the banlieue youth would give in [0 [he "temptation of jihad". 87
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The headscarf issue, as well as the issue of assimilation, was effectively settled on
February 10,2004, when the French National Assembly voted with a striking majority of
494 to 36 to pass legislation illegalizing the exhibition of the hijab, as well as any other
"conspicuous" religious symbol, inside French schools. The legislation was passed in the
French Senate less than a month later.88 This complete exclusion of private matters from
the public realm, following a strict secularist approach, effectively homogenizes the
public sphere, which discriminates against those who wish to exhibit any culture other
than that of the dominant French culture promoted by the state.
89
In the words of
Mahamet Timera, "If integration can merge with the type of immigration signified by the
loss of one's origins, the promotion of ethnic identity disrupts the French republican
project of integration. In contrast to what one observes elsewhere, the promotion of
ethnicity is being systematically stigmatized.,,90
Today, the process of integration has become even more stringent than in the past.
Immigration in general is becoming more and more regulated by criteria such as public
health, public order, and public safety91 New and redesigned immigration laws have
demonstrated a move away from voluntary to mandatory cultural assimilation. Also,
cultural assimilation is now a prerequisite not only for citizenship but also for admission
into the country for any prolonged amount of time. Such cultural assimilation has
evol ved from the zoal of social inclusi on to a means of the exclusion of undes irable
b
immigrants, in order to socially engineer the French demographic
92
While this may
seem extreme, it is in response to an explosion of immigration over the past few decades.
The effects of technology and globalization facilitate integration. For example, the easy
airline travel, inter-state highways, and communication avenues such as cell phones aod
the internet which, through the use of satellites, can cross continents. Thus the world in
general, and France in particular, is experiencing the largest wave of immigration in
history. Worldwide, there are over 191 million immigrants in the world, which is over
88 EI.rsa T. Beller, 581-
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three percent of the world's population, and this number will only increase.
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In France
in 2008, immigrants made up nineteen percent of the total population.
94
In addition to the
incredible number of immigrants, the demographic of the current wave of immigration is
different. Most people who immigrate to France come from non-European, non-liberal
societies, bringing with them their culture which stands to challenge France's liberal
values. These immigrants are also generally geographically concentrated and maintain
close ties with their home country, creating an "inside out community" that exists outside
of the predominant French culture.
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Also alarming for the French system of inunigration and integration is the
problem of religion. France has the highest minority Muslim population in Europe, and
with an increase in Muslims come the increase in fear of radicals. The French scholar
Olivier Roy observes that radical Islamism is usually not actually a product of the
religion, but due to a collision of tradition and modernity. The obligation to accept
foreign liberal ideas and policies creates a crisis of identity. In fact, studies show that
second and third generation French Muslims more strongly identify with their religion
than their parents.96
The current French Civil Code requires that one must demonstrate a sense of
identity with the French Republic, some level of civic participation, or both. In other
words, demonstrative assimilation into the French national culture is mandated. If those
requirements are not met, the government reserves the right to refuse citizenship, because
"no one may be nationalized unless he proves his assimilation into the French
community.t" This forced assimilation required to immigrate to France and become a
naturalized citizen, stems from the perceived failure of Maghrebi immigrants to integrate
into French culture, as well as the consequential tensions that resulted in the riots and
civil unrest of 2005. As of January 1,2007, in order to receive a permanent residence
permit, every immigrant must sign a Contral d'occueil e/ d'integralion (Reception and
Integration Contract), which obliges the immigrant to respect the historic and
fundamental values of the French RepubliC, as well as take language lesson to learn
93 .
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French and participate in a one-day civic training program. Refusal to adhere to the
contract's terms can result in the state's refusal to issue or renew a residence permit or a
f 98 . . ..'me. Included 111 the values of the Repubbc ISthe Idea of secularism. Immigrants are
expected to respect the rights of man as prescribed by the state, including each
individual's freedom of belief and freedom from religious influence. Therefore,
ostentatious displays of religion are perceived as an inability to comply with the
fundamental value of secularism (larGite).
The crackdown on immigration has affected others as well, though. Since the
mid-1990s, France has been strengthening the verification requirements necessary to
renew passports and ID cards due to the suspicion that a substantial amount of foreigners
had falsified claims in order to receive French pasSIJorts. In light of the recent tizhteninzo 0
of immigration requirements, the rules have become even more strict. In 2008 alone,
about 18,000 people were refused the renewal of their passports or ID cards because they
did not have unquestionably proven proof of nationality. As a TIME magazine reporter
states, "people born in former French colonies to nationalized immigrant parents or to
French families abroad are being subject to a paper chase that often leads to dead ends.
Many fear they may lose their French nationality altogether.,,99 French officials often ask
for the provision of official birth certificates for several family members, including
parents and sometimes even grandparents. 100 However, the process only applies to
French nationals born abroad or those born to immigrant parents, creating what seems to
many to be a biased system.
Students wishing to study in France have also experienced a harder time obtaining
a visa and temporary residence permit, especially those from African countries. A new
"filter" was added in 2005, the Centre pour des etudes en France (CEF). This
organization, which works in union with the French embassy in Morocco and other
African nations, was put in place to ensure only high school graduates are selected for
98 .
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study, as well as to verbalJy discourage less financially stable applicants from
I· 101app ymg.
The European Union has not yet established admission criteria for immigrants.
However, member states have decided upon a common integration policy for those who
wish to join any of the participating countries. The Common Basic Principles for
Immigrant Integration Policy include "basic knowledge of the host society's language,
history, and institutions, basic values of the EU and fundamental human rights, and
participation of immigrants in the democratic process." 102 The Pact on Immigration and
Asylum, a more recent document adopted by the EU, deals with formatting the basic
principles of integration. However, the Pact allows member states to decide on the
conditions of immigrant admission, as well as set their number and regulate admission
criteria, stipulating it contain the respect for EU values "such as human rights, freedom of
opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men and women, and the compulsory
schooling of children."lo3 France includes aJl of those in the values of the French
Republic, as well as French culture. Essentially, this requires for admission based on the
policies of national constitutionalism, or the practice that any immigrant seeking
citizenship or asylum must become familiar with tile state's constitutional rights and
principles and accept them. They do not have to openly agree with them, per se, but they
must accept and respect them. 104 In so doing, the immigrant consents to become a
citizen, no one forces them. By becoming a citizen, that person enjoys all the benefits of
citizenship, so it is only fair they accept the country's constitutional measures in return.
Therefore, the state protects its constitution, the rights of its citizens, and in so doing, a
large part of the national culture.
French Perception of Immigrants
In light of the riots during 2005, many people are now aware of the civil and
cultural unrest present in France, due almost entirely to the dynamic between national
French citizens and immigrants, as well as the children of immigrants, who are of African
101 Virginie Guiraudon, 371.
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descent. Most of those immigrants are black or Arab Muslims, a fact which comes in
conflict with the predominant white Catholic French culture. Starting in the 1970s and
gaining speed in the 1980s to today, a strong policy of assimilation was put in place in
order to better integrate the immigrants to French society. A policy which started out
voluntary has since become mandatory in light of a perceived failure to assimilate on the
part of the African immigrants. It can be argued, however, that such a failure was in fact
caused by the French citizens who refused to accept the cultural difference the
immigrants brought with them, as well as the immigrants themselves. For various
different reasons, the French population in general has treated the last few decades of
immigration as an invasion, and assumed that Muslim immigrants are inassimilable.
As was mentioned earlier in this work, many scholars attribute at least a part of
the animosity felt for African immigrants to France's loss of its North African colonies.
The appearance of African immigrants on French soil after independence added insult to
injury, and many felt as if it was an invasion by a culturally inferior people. lOS The sense
of invasion continued as more and more immigrants entered France, especially when the
immigrants were sans-papiers, literally without papers, or illegal. In fact, a lot of media
and political attention centered on illegal immigration, a focus which brought different
political factions to a consensus regarding foreigners.l " Racism and prejudice against
North Africans and black Africans, however did not begin with Algeria's victory and
independence. Rather it dates back to pre-colonial times, when France felt it was her
mission to colonize and civilize the inferior African peoples. 107 The animosity between
Christianity and Islam dates back even further, all the way the Middle Ages and the
Crusades.l'" But that is not the only reason for the current debate. The French are more
concerned with assimilation and adherence to the ideas and values of the state.
The devoutly secular French oppose "ostentatious" shows of religiosity,
especially when that religion is culturally different than the French majority. Such a
demonstration both draws attention to difference and causes the French to feel
105 Elisa T. Beller, 594.
106 "Cette focalisation sur !'immigration clandestine en particulier a permis de construire un large
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proselytized or subject to propaganda. 109The fact that Muslim immigrants retained
obvious signs of their cultural heritage, such as wearing the traditional headscarf did not
help their cause, especially since it was an overt symbol of Islam. For many, Arabs and
black Africans were "too different, not European. Too Muslim, not Catholic. Too black ,
too visible. In short, they lacked the qualities that made the former migrations
acceptable: European, white and Catholic."llo In contrast to those "ideal" qualities,
recent headlines discussing the war on terror and the affaire des voiles has emphasized all
immigrants as Muslims. III And the Muslims have been told so often that they are not
French that they are beginning to adopt that view as well. In an interview with middle
school children, Yamina Benguigui discusses the subject of citizenship. Though all of
the children were born in France, and some are even fair haired or fair skinned, they do
not believe they are truly French because they are Muslim. One boy replied, "You know
very well that to be French means to eat pork, practice the French religion, be
Christians!,,112
Also, as is often the case during times of economic trouble, many French citizens
blamed their troubles and the nation's on the influx of immigrants. In the words of
Mahamet Timera, "Illegal immigration is far from a new phenomenon. It has been tied in
with the history of immigration. Forgotten and tolerated, it became a more marked
concern during periods of crisis by giving free reign to diverse fantasies: exaggeration of
the number of illegal aliens, fear of an invasion by inassimilable people, etc". 113And this
trend has not abated. Virginie Guiraudon remarks that "Longitudinal survey data
collected annually for the Commission nationale consultative des Droits de I 'Homme
since 1989 and qualitative studies also reveal that negative attitudes towards immigrants
109 .Elisa T. Beller, 611.
110 "Trop differents, pas europeens. Trop musulmans, pa~ cat~oliques. :-rop noirs, trop visibles. Bref, il
leur manque les « qua lites » qui faisaient Ie propre des migrations anteneures : europeens, blancs, et
catholiques." Mahamet Timera, 46.
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prevail and that the least accepted groupS are North Africans and Moslems.,,114 In recent
years, the far right party called the Front National (FN) has stirred up feelings of
negativity toward minorities and immigrants. The party gains more electoral votes with
every election, demonstrating a growing trend of dislike and suspicion of cultural
difference. 1IS In the 2012 presidential election, the FN's candidate, Marine Le Pen, the
daughter of the party's founder, received 17.9% of the vote, the highest number the party
has ever seen, and its membership numbers over 50,000.
116
The treatment of inunigrants, though, did not inspire them to integrate themselves
into French society. Although most French citizens were far from welcoming toward
immigrants, the 1980s marked the beginning of outright injustice and violence against
them. Acting out against the unemployment that would otherwise put them on the same
footing with immigrants, disenfranchised white Frenchmen, called beaufs, (a term equal
to the English term "good 01' boys) initiated a series of attacks on immigrant men and
children, referred to by them as ratons (rats). IJ7 These instances, as well as the almost
constant occurrence of police brutality went unpunished. In response to these acts, while
many banlieue youth participated in the Marche des Beurs, many others resorted to a riot
culture of violent acts against the police and society at large.
'1B
This created a public
persona of violence and "ethnic territorial gangs" that further polluted the immigrants'
image in the eyes of the French publie. 119 However, French men of the Revol utionary
period such as Voltaire and Beccaria advocated "that public authorities must take the
blame for crimes that could have been prevented by wise legislation," such as anti-hate
laws, adequate housing and employment. 120 Even the educators of the banlieue children
exhibit signs of prejudice, despite the ruling of the Conseif d'Etot that the classroom
should be an area of tolerance. In Fran,ois Begaudeau's critically acclaimed novel, The
Class, he describes several insrances where teachers complain about the ethnic students,
as well as make racist and stereotypical remarks. For example, he describes students l1.S
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"hoodlums". 121He also includes a monologue of a fellow teacher that includes
sentiments such as "they're absolutely so low, so dishonest, always looking to make
trouble, but go ahead, guys, go ahead stay right there in your crap neighborhood ... 1 tell
you, they're like animals.,,]22
Besides violence and prejudice, a history of neglect has surrounded the
immigrants and their children. Relegated to slums since the first heavy wave of
immigration after World War II, those of African heritage are subject to unemployment;
poverty; inadequate housing, transportation, and schooling; unsanitary conditions, and the
general aura of "shattered dreams". i23 Also of concern is the ever-growing trend of
segregation in both housing and education. 124This treatment of immigrants, which is
certainly not new, is in direct contradiction with the spirit of Montesquieu and the ideas
of the French Revolution. Montesquieu said, "[the state], which owes to all its citizens a
secure subsistence, suitable food and clothing, and a manner of living that is not contrary
to good health.,,125 Although all of the above-mentioned aspects of banlieue life are
undesirable, perhaps one of the worst is the unemployment. Not being able to obtain
viable employment creates a vicious circle from which the immigrants and their
descendants cannot escape. According to the 1999 census, compared to the national
average of 13%, of the active foreign population, 24.1% were unemployed, as well as
22% of foreign-born workers. The percentage increases for young Maghrebi men. "The
percentage of unemployed men of Maghreb origin in the 16-29 age group oscillates
between 34% to 45% meaning of all men of Maghreb origin between 16 and 29 years of
age, 34 to 45% are unemployed (20 to 25% for women between 16 and 29 that are of
M, h b .. 1 d) ,,126ag re -ongm are unemp oye .
This, among other things, has caused many Franco-Maghrebis to identify first as
Muslim, then as French. 127Yamina Benguigui explains, "Some young people think they
will find in Islam the answers to questions that neither their parents nor society can
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resolve. In the search for identity and recognition, they define themselves as Muslims
before anythi ng else." 128 Between inadequate living condi tions, constant animosity
received from national French citizens, and the rules of forced immigration, it is small
wonder people of African heritage would choose to identify with the part of their identity
that did not discri minate. This tendency only added fuel to the extreme right belief that
the Musli m immi gran t subcul ture tesisted the central values of the Republic, especi ally
that of lareite. This concern was present during the affaire des »oiles as well as during
the 2005 demonstrations and riots that took place in the hanlieues. "[slam posed a
competing claim to universality, like that once posed by the Catholic Church. Analysts
of the [2005] outbreaks agreed that the frustrations of immigrant youth revealed their
sense of isolation from French society, reinforced hy then Interior Minister, and later
President de la Republique, Nicolas Sarkozy's denunciation of them as racailie, or scum"
that should be cleaned out of the hanlieues.129 The fact that famous public officials, even
ones who become president, publicly voice their estimation that immigrant populations
are "scum" is incredibly indicative of the unstable environment in which immigrants and
their descendants currently find themselves.
The sense of isolation and neglect felt by second and third generation children
most certainly is one of the reasons behind the recent violence. Yamina Ileng
ui
g
ui
expands upon this by saying, "Unbeknownst to their parents, unbeknownst to France,
who seems astonished by their existence, they are there. Their cries, their violence is the
most powerful type 0 flegitimate claim: 'We ate a par! of this society!'" 130 While some
turn to violence and acts of protest, others tum to Islam. Still others, so disrupted by the
inability to find a social or psychological equilibrium and plagued by both scholastic
failure and the inability to obtain employment, turn to drugs. 131 Such a lifestyle also
eventually leads to the contraction of AIDS or le sida
D2
But all it takes for the youth to
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feel wanted and to feel like they belong, is to bestow just a little kindness upon them and
treat them like everyone else. In one of Yamin a Benguigui's interviews, she spoke with a
Maghrebi teacher who acts as a cultural advisor to the youth of one of France's many
banlieues. He described an outing where several teenagers went to a restaurant for a
night out. After receiving several declinations from establishments, he finally found one
that would take them. The proprietor was a traditional French citizen, but he treated them
as equals and included them in the fun atmosphere of the resto, By so doing, he made
them feel so welcome they did not want to leave. 133 If more French persons could be so
accepting, this debate may not even exist.
Conclusion
Clearly the subject of their identity is very important to the French, but is it truly a
stagnant, never changing phenomenon as some observers seem to believe? While the
citizens of France may hold strongly to ideals such as liberty, equality, solidarity, and
secularism-ideals that certainly form the backbone of the French public sphere-that is
not all that France is. France is a cultural epicenter, and always has been. No one
stipulates, however, that culture cannot change and evolve, in fact scholars such as Jan
Nederveen Pieterse argue quite the conrrary.l " All countries are evolving at a faster rate
due to the effects of globalization. This new changing global environment is most visible
in the presence of immigrants. In France, the 1110stprominent example is the growing
Muslim community. The conflicts in the nation arise daily due less to the clash of
cultures than to the resistance toward change. Yes, there is a conflict between the long
history of Catholicism and the new presence of Islam, and the arising issues are to be
expected. Added with the presence of economic recession and unemployment, it is not
abnormal that social tensions will rise and the "outsiders" will be blamed. Those
outsiders, for the most part, are French citizens, however, and they have the same rights
as they're white French counterparts.
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France, like any other country, has evolved until today and many observers, as we
have seen, feel that the recent multiculturalism, particularly the influence of Muslim
Immigrants, is affecting the core of the French values, especially the concept of
secularism. However, in this global environment, where a mother in France can instantly
send an email to her son in Australia, and he can call her moments later or board a plane
to see her, it is ridiculous to believe cultures will not change and meld with each other.
And who is to say that is a negative? Traders and explorers have been bringing theories
and advancements from other cultures for centuries. Now the process has only been
quickened and more normalized. There is sign of a move in the positive direction,
however, especially with the recent creation of the Cite nationale d'histoire de
I 'immigration (Museum of National Immigration History). This museum not only
educates the population about the long (and not recent) history of immigration, but also
includes facts concerning all the immigrant groups, all in an effort to combat racism and
promote the integration of second-generation immigrants, diversifying cultural
identity.135 And of course not all of France is opposed to immigration or immigrants. It
is the very vocal conservatives who are creating most of the fuss.
In the words of socialist Martine Aubry:
"Where is liberty when the fruit of one's labor does not allow one to be suitably
housed and leads sometimes to being unable to send one's children to the school
cantine after the twentieth of the month? Where is equality when a worker's child
has only half the likelihood of completing his studies as the child of a cadre?
Where is fraternity when one starts envying one's neighbor his overtime at work
. ..' . 11 ?" 136and feanng immigrants, if not the young genera y.
France's current debate is certainly wrought with friction and conflict, and even the most
liberal of citizens can find themselves agreeing with conservative ideas. As with any
periOd of change, France is currently conflicted, and may be for some time yet. What is
sure, though, is that a resolution will come. It remains to be seen what that will be,
however, and both white Christians and Muslim North Africans are finding cause to
Worry that they stand to lose rights, culture, and tradition.
135 f i . r /I
Geard Noiriel, "The Historian in the Cite: how to reconcile history and memory 0 rmrrugra IOn r
~useum International 59, no. 1/2 (May 2007): 13-17.
Thomas M. Adams, 468.
